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Abstract 
 
The concept of “smart power” is relevant for the analysis of European Union’s 
external action, insofar as the relations with other parties include conditionality 
and payments. The Eastern Partnership falls in that category, and the recent 
developments associated with the 2013 Vilnius  Summit can be understood in 
relation with the European Union’s policies toward the Eastern neighbourhood. 
The article suggests that a better combination of hard power and soft power 
strategies is needed, in order to promote European values and interests in the 
region.  
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1. Introduction  
The Eastern Partnership (EaP) summit took place in Vilnius (November 
28-29,  2013),  confirming  the  pessimism  of  the  political  commentators  in 
Brussels and elsewhere. The ambitious agenda set up for the summit was not 
completed, and the build-up to Vilnius showed several weak points of the EaP. 
Ukraine’s  last  minute  decision  not  to  sign  the  Association  Agreement  (AA) 
while particularly significant, was not a singular setback: Armenia had already 
chosen to seek membership in the Russian-dominated Custom Union, despite an 
initial interest in the Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement (DCFTA) 
included  in  the  AA.  As  for  the  two  authoritarian  post-Soviet  regimes  that 
participate in the EaP, Azerbaijan opted for a low-level type of cooperation with 
the European Union (EU), while Belarus maintained its usual distance. The fact 
that Moldova and Georgia initialled their AAs, while positive in itself, could not 
alter the overall unsatisfactory outcome, from an EU perspective. 
The  European  Union  has often  been associated  with  the  concepts  of 
“soft power”, “hard power” and “smart power”, it would seem appropriate to 
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reassess,  in  the  light  of  the  recent  developments,  the  salience  of  the  soft 
power/smart power wielded by the EU in its Eastern neighbourhood.  
As the EU will probably proceed to an evaluation of its policies toward 
the  Eastern  neighbourhood,  the  soft  power/smart  power  perspective  might 
contribute, despite its limits, to the development of new approaches that would 
help the EU promote its vision regarding the post-Soviet area. 
The first section of the paper introduces the issue of EU “power with 
adjectives”, providing a discussion of several influential concepts in EU political 
studies. Its main aim is to distinguish between “soft”, “civilian” and “normative” 
power, and to argue that the interactions between the EU and its Eastern partners 
are not immune from hard power behaviour. The next section is dedicated to a 
review of the external governance vs. partnership issue in EU’s policy toward 
the  Eastern  neighbourhood,  and  illustrates  some  of  the  limits  of  the  Eastern 
Partnership model, identified in the literature. The third part includes a round-up 
of  several  expert  opinions  on  the  context  and  outcome  of  the  Vilnius  EaP 
summit. The final section advances a number of tentative conclusions and argues 
in favour of a “smarter” strategy based on the combination between “hard” and 
“soft” approaches. The EaP and, in more general terms, the relationship between 
the EU and its Eastern neighbours cannot be framed exclusively in terms of soft 
power.  
 
2. European Union: power with adjectives 
Soft  power  is  one  of  the  most  influential  concepts  in  contemporary 
International Relations. Introduced by Joseph S. Nye in his work Bound to Lead 
(Nye, 1990), it was later refined in several books and articles, including Soft 
Power: the Means to Success in World Politics (Nye, 2004) and The Future of 
Power (Nye, 2010).  
Nye defines power as an actor’s ability to act, in a social situation, so as to 
influence others in order to get the desired results. While hard power implies the 
use of coercion and/or rewards, soft power is the ability to obtain what you desire 
through attraction, rather than coercion. “Hard and soft power are related because 
they  are  both  aspects  of  the  ability  to  achieve  one's  purpose  by  affecting  the 
behaviour of others. The distinction between them is one of degree, both in the 
nature of the behaviour and in the tangibility of the resources” (Nye, 2004, p.7). 
Soft power is, consequently, the ability to affect others by means of 
cooption, including agenda-framing, persuasion and fostering positive attraction. 
Among the major soft power resources available to actors, one should count: 
multiple channels of communication that contribute to agenda-setting; cultural 
customs and ideas that approximate the prevalent global norms; and a credibility 
that is reinforced through values and policies. In terms of soft-power behaviour, 
Nye  identifies  three  fundamental  types:  agenda-setting,  attraction,  and 
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Nye warns against confusing resources with behaviour: many types of 
resources can contribute to soft power, but this does not entail that soft power is 
any type of behaviour.  
 
The use of force, payment, and some agenda-setting based on them I call 
hard power. Agenda setting that is considered legitimate by the target, 
positive  attraction,  and  persuasion  are  the  parts  of  the  spectrum  of 
behaviour I include in soft power (Nye, 2010, p. 20).    
 
On the other hand, “payments, aid and other positive sanctions . . . have 
both a hard and a soft power dimension . . . Providing a payment and removing a 
payment are two sides of the same coin” (ibidem, p. 76).  
Smart  power  refers  to  the  strategies  which  link  means  and  goals:  in 
order to achieve its goals, an actor must effectively combine hard and soft power 
resources, in changing social circumstances (Nye, 2010, p. xiv). Consequently, 
international exchanges that imply economic payments contain a hard power 
component  and  require  adequate  combinations  of  strategies  – in  other  word, 
wielding smart power. From this perspective, the European Union is involved 
not only in military, but also in non-military exchanges that involve coercion, 
and needs intelligent strategies for combining coercion and attraction.  
The soft power approach to the EU has become popular among political 
scientists, and has been eagerly adopted by EU and member-states officials. For 
instance, Eniko Landaburu, at the time the Commission’s Director General for 
Enlargement, argued that enlargement and the ENP are illustrative examples of 
“soft power Europe” (Landaburu, 2006). Regarding the ENP, he wrote:  
 
The ENP therefore nicely defines the nature of the EU's soft power; it is 
the credibility of the Community method within the EU itself that gives us 
our ability to persuade others outside our borders. The corollary of this 
is that the further away from the magnetic attraction of the EU itself we 
intend to deploy our soft power, the clearer must be our member states' 
commitment to the unique formal and informal processes that make up 
the  Community  method.  If  we  are  to  preserve  an  international  order 
based on the rule of law and respect for human rights, democracy and 
good governance, the EU needs to persuade others of its own unwavering 
commitment (Landaburu, 2006). 
 
For  the  Swedish  foreign  minister  Carl  Bildt,  soft  power  is  equally 
important: 
 
Again and again, we see how the soft power of Europe - the inspiration of 
our model of integration and shared sovereignty, the magnetism of our 126   Lucian-Dumitru DÎRDALĂ 
process of integration and of building increasingly close relations with 
our  neighbours,  the  transformational  capacity  of  our  experiences  in 
conflict  resolution  and  state-building  in  complex  areas  -  is  becoming 
increasingly relevant in the world in which we are living (Bildt, 2007).  
 
The peculiarity of European Community / European Union as an actor in 
international affairs has been a constant point of interest for political theorists, 
especially since Fran￧ois Duch￪ne introduced the concept of civilian power, in 
the  1970s  (Duch￪ne,  1972).  His  perspective  generated  ample  discussions, 
including rebukes from the Realist standpoint, such as Hedley Bull’s assertion 
that civilian power is a contradiction in terms (Bull, 1982), and that Europe 
should  in  fact  strengthen  its  military  capacities  and  build  a  military  alliance 
within the already existing NATO framework (ibidem, p.164). The debate over 
“civilian power Europe” has continued, and has in fact gained in relevance after 
the Maastricht Treaty created the political framework for an EU security policy. 
However, the theoretical exchanges concentrated on the first half of Duch￪ne’s 
definition (“a civilian group long on economic power and relatively short on 
armed  forces”),  and  largely  ignored  the  second  half  (“a  force  for  the 
international diffusion of civilian and democratic standards”), which is in fact 
normative (Stavridis, 2001, p. 44). According to Karen E. Smith, the civilian 
ends envisaged by Duch￪ne and other supporters of “civilian power Europe” 
were  “international  cooperation,  solidarity,  domestication  of  international 
relations  (or  strengthening  the  rule  of  law  in  international  relations), 
responsibility for the global environment, and the diffusion of equality, justice 
and tolerance” (Smith, 2005, p. 66). Interpretations of civilian power also tend to 
highlight the role of diplomatic cooperation in solving international problems, 
the  importance  of  economic  power,  and  the  legally-binding  institutions  of 
international law (Diez and Manners, 2007, p. 178). 
Arguing that civilian power is not the same thing as pacifism, Stavridis 
writes that a civilian power by design – rather than by default, due to the lack of 
capacities  –  would  consider  “military  means  to  be  on  one  end  of  a  long 
spectrum, with trade and use of economic sanctions on the other (ibidem, p. 50).  
The concept of “normative power” introduced by Ian Manners (2002) is 
a late response to Bull’s scepticism toward civilian power (Bull, 1982) – in fact, 
Bull’s question (“a contradiction in terms?”) is included by Manners in the title 
of his article. Arguing that the civilian vs. military power led to a inadequate 
concentration on the state-like features of the EU, he looks at Europe’s identity 
in the international system: the EU’s  “normative difference” comes from its 
historical context, hybrid polity and political-legal constitution (Manners, 2002, 
p. 240). The EU’s normative basis is defined by core norms (peace, liberty, 
democracy, rule of law, human rights) and minor norms (social solidarity, anti-
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allow the EU to “present and legitimate itself as being more than the sum of its 
parts” (ibidem, p. 244). The diffusion of these norms is shaped by a set of factors 
that  actually  define  the  EU’s  normative  power:  contagion,  informational 
diffusion,  procedural  diffusion,  transference,  overt  diffusion,  and  the  cultural 
filter (ibidem, pp. 244-245).   
Returning on the concept of normative power two years later, Manners 
(2004)  elaborated  on  the  differences  between  normative  power  and  civilian 
power. Certain contributions dealing with the EU as a “civilian power” have 
bridged  the  gap  between  the  two  concepts,  in  the  sense  that,  by  using  and 
practicing particular kinds of norms, civilian power can be read as one specific 
form of normative power (Diez and Manners, 2007, p. 177).  
However, Manners points out that the former emerged from a rationalist 
theoretical field and was attached to a Westphalian, inter-state system frame of 
reference, which neither Duch￪ne nor other analysts of civilian power thought of 
altering (Manners, 2004, pp. 3-4). By contrast, the normative power approach 
attempts to “transcend the normality of world politics towards world society” 
(Diez and Manners, 2007, p. 179). 
 
3. Partnership and external governance in the Eastern neighbourhood 
The  theoretical  literature  on  the  Eastern  Partnership  (EaP)  is 
understandably  related  to  the  earlier  contributions  on  the  European 
Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), so that reviewing a few issues covered by the 
latter would be relevant for the purpose of this study. A major point of interest is 
the influence of the logic of the Eastern enlargement over the ENP and, later, 
over the EaP. Topics such as leverage, conditionality of external governance 
have inspired all three bodies of literature.  
Sandra  Lavenex  argues  that  “with  its  emphasis  on  hierarchical  and 
horizontal,  formal  and  informal  forms  of  policy-making,  the  notion  of 
governance  is  particularly  useful  for  studying  relations  with  third  countries 
which, although not EU member states, are included in the pursuit of (internal) 
policy goals” (Lavenex, 2004, p. 682). External governance occurs when “the 
institutional/legal  boundary  is  moved  beyond  the  circle  of  member  states” 
(ibidem, p. 683). From the EU perspective, this generates a clustering of the 
regions and countries with which EU develops institutionalised relations, and 
several  modes  of  interaction  can  be  identified.  The  Eastern  neighbours  are 
subject to the logic of association, which is, in effect, a securitizing response to 
interdependence  (ibidem,  pp.  687-688).  However,  while  enlargement  was 
designed in order to minimise the variation of EU external governance rules, the 
relations with the European neighbourhood should be open to a wider variety of 
instruments, especially since enlargement is not (yet) on the table and accession 
conditionality is not particularly relevant (Lavanex, Schimmelfennig, 2009, p. 
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privileges sector-based, functional cooperation, which promises to yield better 
outcomes than the top-down, leveraged accession conditionality (Lavenex and 
Schimmelfennig, 2011, p. 887). The horizontal model of governance seems to be 
more suitable than the hierarchical one, in terms of democracy promotion in the 
Eastern neighbourhood (Moga and Pascariu, 2013, p. 157). 
Nevertheless, the logic of enlargement strongly influenced the ENP and, 
later, the EaP. Writing from a historical institutionalist perspective, Gebhart argues 
that EU policies have shown strong signs of structural borrowing from previous 
policies (Gebhart, 2010, p. 98) and that one should not be surprised to find its 
logic reflected in the ENP, since  enlargement was widely seen as a success. The 
totally  different  conditions  under  which  the  ENP  develops  raise,  however,  a 
serious risk of failure: “The ENP offers a set of weak tools, a softened and diluted 
version of the enlargement model, while the nature and level of challenges to be 
tackled in the European neighbourhood have reached an all-time high in terms of 
complexity and geopolitical disruption” (ibidem, p. 104). 
The present circumstances in the Eastern neighbourhood would require, 
argues Korosteleva, a new approach – one that would depart from the logic of 
enlargement  and  external  governance,  and  would  turn  to  a  logic  of  genuine 
partnership.  Lacking  a  suitable  notion  of  partnership,  as  well  as  a  clear 
understanding  of  “joint  ownership”  and  “shared  values”,  the  EU  “elected  to 
deploy a means-tested notion of external governance, used for EU enlargement 
and operating through conditionality and top-down rule transfer” (Korosteleva, 
2011, p. 6). This leads to a situation in which the neighbours are transformed 
from “others” – sovereign subjects with values and interests of their own – into 
“objects of governance”, undermining the very idea of partnership (ibidem, p. 7). 
Korosteleva’s recent book on the EaP (Korosteleva, 2012) criticism of 
the  EU’s  inability  to  advance  a  genuine  partnership  to  its  Eastern  European 
neighbours. Her starting point is the notion of partnership as mutual adjustment 
of actors’ policies in the international arena, drawn from the neoliberal literature 
on cooperation. She stresses the importance of learning during the interactions, 
as well as of an anticipated outcome that leads to the joint ownership of goals 
and benefits (ibidem, pp. 20-21). However, the ENP/EaP framework displayed a 
vision  of  partnership  as  complementary  to  external  governance,  so  that  the 
normal concern for mutual goals and benefits stands alongside EU’s request that 
partners develop allegiance and commitment to its norms (ibidem, pp. 27-28).  
 
Portraying itself as a ‘pole of attraction’ . . . or a ‘civilising’, ‘ethical’, 
‘normative’ or indeed transformative force . . . to justify its ownership of 
decision-making and agenda-setting may be constructive for promoting 
reforms, but incongruent with the principles of partnership-building . . . 
It promotes what it deems to be valid and ‘universal’ norms, but which 
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A  failure  to  comprehend  the  “other”  and  its  “otherness”  favours  its 
representation  as  a  threat  and  leads  to  a  securitisation  of  EU’s  external 
governance and to a drive to change it, according to your own image. Such an 
attitude  toward  the  non-EU  “other”  in  the  ENP/EaP  framework,  argues 
Korosteleva, would lead to its failure (ibidem, p. 59). 
 
4. The Eastern Partnership and the Vilnius moment   
The  perspectives  of  the  Eastern  Partnership  (EaP)  were  seriously 
challenged by the setbacks recorded in the run-up to the Vilnius summit, as 
Armenia and Ukraine cast doubts over the future of the EaP.  
Blokmans and Kostanyan deplore the fact that the final declaration of 
the  summit  did  not  include  any  reference  to  Art.  49  of  the  Treaty  of  the 
European Union, which covers enlargement, the official document remaining 
somewhat vague, though the use of “ever closer relationship” might be read in 
the Thessaloniki spirit. Pointing out that, in certain respects, the commitments 
taken by the Eastern partners in the Association Agreements (AAs) are more 
advanced than those operating in the Western Balkans, the authors argue that the 
EU should open its doors to the Eastern European partners (EEP) (Blokmans and 
Kostanyan, 2013, p. 2). In an earlier piece, written before the Armenian and 
Ukrainian  defections,  Kostanyan  had  illustrated  the  difficulties  which  a 
“maximalist scenario” – granting the prospect of EU membership to the EEPs 
would have to face. At the current stage, several member-states opposed any 
perspective of such an enlargement, but their positions might, however, change 
in time (Kostanyan, 2013, p. 2).  
A  membership-lite  or associated  membership  alternative  might  prove 
attractive for certain EEPs, writes Kristi Raik, since they are far from ready in 
terms  of  the  criteria  for  enlargement.  “However,  the  option  of  having  to 
implement EU rules without taking part in their creation is hardly tempting, 
unless it is an intermediary phase on the path towards full membership” (Raik, 
2013, p. 23). In fact, given the conditionality the EEPs are submitted to – which 
is comparable to the one applied to the candidates for enlargement – the EU has 
already created “an exclusive model of differentiated integration” (ibidem, p. 
24).  In  time,  a  decision  should  be  taken  regarding  the  EEP’s  prospects  for 
accession, which currently lacks enough support from the member states. 
The  impact  of  developments  taking  place  in  the  EU  itself  over  the 
dynamics  of  the  EaP  should  be  taken  into  account,  argues  Rafał  Sadowski, 
pointing to the consequences of a possible multiple-speed Europe: the issue of 
enlargement would lose much of its relevance, accession might become easier 
for outsiders, but membership would be less meaningful and beneficial for EEPs. 
Consequently, both the elites and the general public would become less willing 
to pursue significant reforms (Sadowski, 2013, p. 44). His general conclusion is 130   Lucian-Dumitru DÎRDALĂ 
that the EaP has failed to foster sufficient change in the partner countries, and 
that the bureaucratic structures developed within its framework are not able to 
respond to the changes taking place in both the EU and the partner countries 
(ibidem, p. 47). Another major limitation of the EaP process lies in the fact that 
the public opinion in the EEPs has not yet received tangible benefits, which 
would create societal pressures towards reform.    
Olaf Osica sees the EaP as “an emanation of European soft power” and 
suggests that it possesses a geopolitical dimension, as it “has become a tool with 
the  potential  to  violate  the  economic,  and  hence  political,  status  quo  in  the 
common neighbourhood of Russia and the EU” (Osica, 2013). A strong offer for 
the EEP is needed, including the abolition of visas and other measures, including 
steps that would foster society-to-society relations. In the more distant future, the 
EaP might open the door for enlargement. 
Peter Munk Jensen argues that a reconsideration of the EaP is necessary, 
after  the  Vilnius  summit,  in  order  to  avoid  the  unravelling  of  the  entire 
instrument. As there is a notable divergence in terms of outcomes, and only two 
out of six countries are prepared for a stronger relationship with Brussels, Jensen 
suggests that the EaP be replaced by individual agreements, adapted to the needs 
and wishes of the EEPs. “The current situation is not tenable, as it implies the 
risk of ending up with a new division of Europe” (Jensen, 2013). 
In an opinion piece published by EU Observer, Forbrig writes that the 
setback in the EU-Ukraine relationship had three concurrent explanations. At an 
individual level, the tactics of President Yanukovych and his dual game with 
Brussels  and  Moscow  prevented  the  signature  of  the  AA.  The  second  point 
refers to the time frames with which the two sides operated: the reforms required 
by the European Union offer long term positive effects, but bring about serious 
costs, in the shorter run; on the other hand, the Kiev government needed short 
term benefits, for both economic and electoral reasons. Finally, “the EU has 
been  slow  to  respond  to  the  new  geopolitical  competition  over  the  eastern 
neighbourhood, into which it is being drawn by Russia” (Forbrig, 2013). His 
recommendations  include  engaging  directly  with  the  EEP  societies  and 
enhancing people-to-people contacts, but also mobilising a much larger financial 
and  institutional  support  –  similar  to  the  one  that  accompanied  the  Eastern 
enlargement.  
Rejecting  the  “geopolitical  catastrophe”  thesis  relative  to  the  Vilnius 
outcome,  Popescu  suggests  that  serious  challenges  lie  ahead  for  Moldova, 
Georgia, as well as for Ukraine – which in fact “chose not to choose” (Popescu, 
2013,  p.  1).  On  the  other hand,  the  EU  would  be  well  advised  to treat  these 
countries  as  if  the  AAs  were  already  in  force.  Other  issues,  such  as  the 
liberalisation of the visa regime for the countries that meet the conditions, would 
be helpful in building domestic support for the pro-European choice (ibidem, p. 2). AFTER VILNIUS: THE EU’S SMART POWER AND THE EASTERN NEIGHBOURHOOD     131 
 
 
Similar  proposals  regarding  the  temporary  application  by  the  EU  of 
certain  trade  concessions  included  in  DCFTA  after  signing  or  initialling  the 
agreement are included among the recommendations of a paper published by the 
Eastern Europe Studies Centre in Vilnius (Kasčiūnas et al., 2013, p. 7). The 
effectiveness of the EaP would have a lot to gain if association were treated as a 
stage  in  the  EEPs  evolution  towards  full  integration,  with  the  possible 
introduction of transitional intervals on the road, in order to delay accession 
(ibidem).  
A rather pessimistic view of the EEP elites and their commitment to 
change can be drawn from Stefan Meister’s article for the European Council on 
Foreign  Relations  (Meister,  2013).  Lacking  sufficient  commitment  for  the 
implementation of the rule of law and other norms promoted by the EU, the 
elites  should  not  be  treated  as  EU’s  partners for  modernisation; instead,  EU 
assistance should target civil society, and a productive dialogue must involve the 
ordinary citizens. “The EU must realise that sustainable reforms demand the 
involvement  of  wider  society,  longer-term  engagement,  and  high 
implementation costs” (ibidem). As far as Russia is concerned, the EU must not 
grant Moscow any right of veto over its policies in the Eastern Neighbourhood, 
but should maintain a framework for discussions (ibidem). 
The  polarisation  of  the  Russian  and  EU  positions  on  the  EaP  is 
detrimental not only to their bilateral relations, but also to Ukraine, writes Peter 
Havlik, since both trading partners are equally important for Kiev (Havlik, 2013, 
p. 7). He argues that the AA/DCFTA would bring Kiev long term benefits, as the 
economy  would  undergo  a  process  of  modernisation  and  would  prove  more 
attractive for Foreign Direct Investment (FDI). However, the EaP is deemed to 
be a failure (ibidem, p. 4)   
Alexei Sekarev concludes that the EU has not succeeded in making the 
EaP attractive to Russia, and pleads against the “either-or” approach, which is 
detrimental to the EEPs (Sekarev 2013, p. 32). Commenting on the Armenian 
decision to seek membership in the Customs Union, and on Ukraine’s decision 
not to sign the AA, Sekarev highlights the fact that, while the orientation toward 
the  EU  had  been  thoroughly  prepared,  these  decisions  lacked  proper  impact 
assessments and concludes that weak institutions tend to generate weak policies 
(ibidem, pp. 32-33).   
Delcour and Wolczuk explain that, in its relations with the EEP, the EU 
offered templates for reform that raised serious difficulties for implementation: 
“Regulatory approximation with EU acquis in the Eastern neighbourhood is a 
costly  and  challenging  proposition.  It  requires  bearing  upfront  political  and 
economic costs and embarking on challenging reforms in pursuit of probable 
long-term  benefits  from  modernisation”  (Delcour  and  Wolczuk,  2013).  They 
argue  that  the  EU’s  strategy  has  been  designed  “with  internal  lenses”, 
overlooking the specific situations of the EEPs, including their ties with (and 132   Lucian-Dumitru DÎRDALĂ 
dependence on) Russia. A differentiation within the EaP will be necessary in the 
future, leading to more flexible frameworks of cooperation (ibidem).  
Several  of  the  arguments  illustrated  above  can  be  found  in  a  study 
elaborated just one year after the launching of the EaP (Boonstra, Shapovalova, 
2010). The terms offered by the EU are too vague and cannot provide sufficient 
incentives for reform. The EU assistance is directed mainly toward governments, 
while  civil  society  actors  receive  too  little  support  (ibidem,  p.  12).  Security 
remains  a  major  concern  for  the  EEPs,  but  the  EU  cannot  offer  short-term 
solutions: “[S]o far, the EU is a weak actor in terms of promoting security in the 
region” (ibidem, p. 13). Finally, stronger incentives – leading up to eligibility for 
accession – are needed if conditionality is to work in the region. 
However,  the  current  stage  of  the  EaP  has  not  brought  about  the 
expected  changes.  Nielsen  and  Vilson  provide  a  critical  account,  from  the 
perspective  of  soft  power:  the  European  Union  was  not  able  to  effectively 
project its power in the Eastern neighbourhood (Nielsen, Vilson, 2013, p. 430). 
The perspective of enlargement would have been an important source of soft 
power in the whole region, and its presence would have given more credibility to 
EU conditionality (ibidem, pp. 430-431). The EaP framework deals primarily 
with governments does not pay too much attention to the civil society and to the 
alternative elites that might generate pressures for domestic change. The EEP 
citizens have not yet received tangible benefits, especially since the visa regime 
has  not  yet  been  liberalised,  while  the  funding  directed  towards  the  EEP  is 
insufficient (ibidem, p. 431). Last, but not least, divisions arose within the EU 
regarding member states’ bilateral relations with Russia and with certain Eastern 
partners, which negatively affected the EU’s ability to wield its soft power in the 
Eastern neighbourhood (ibidem, pp. 432-433).  
 
5.  Conclusions:  a  need  for  a  smart  power  Europe  in  the  Eastern 
Neighbourhood 
By  avoiding  the  simplistic  assimilation  of  hard  power  with  military 
power  and  by  taking  into  account  Nye’s  suggestion  that  any  relationship 
involving  payments  has  a  hard  power  component,  one  could  gain  a  new 
understanding of EU’s action towards the Eastern neighbourhood, in particular 
towards the Eastern Partnership. Most of the objections and criticisms expressed 
by the experts quoted in the preceding section could be met if the EU’s strategies 
in the region were more effective – that is, if they created a better mixture of 
hard power and soft power.  
While the EU is propagating its values and exporting its norms in the 
region,  neither  “civilian  power”  nor  “normative  power”  can  account  for  the 
actual process by which these norms are transmitted to the Eastern partners. On 
the other hand, the concept of EU external governance relies on conditionality AFTER VILNIUS: THE EU’S SMART POWER AND THE EASTERN NEIGHBOURHOOD     133 
 
 
and includes elements of (economic) hard power. In this sense, there is a need 
for a Smart Power Europe. 
There is an obvious need to define the goals of EU’s interaction with its 
Eastern European partners. Milieu goals are important, and Europe’s soft power 
has contributed to their pursuit, but the EU needs to define and improve its 
concept of partnership, as well as to decide, in the future, on a possible new 
wave of enlargement.  
The European Union must also redefine its goals relative to Russia, the 
other major regional player. Geopolitics has been a relatively week point in its 
approach in the Eastern neighbourhood.  
Combining hard power and soft power strategies would probably lead to 
a less integrated approach, heavily influenced by the peculiarities of each EEP, 
but  there  is a  need  to  devise  new  policies to  deal with the  weak  states  and 
defective democracies in the region. 
The mixture of hard and soft strategies would lead to different policy 
constellations, but offering tangible support to the civil society organizations. 
The  societal pressure exerted on the  EEP  governments by  the  civil societies 
would be a helpful complement to the inter-governmental front of the bilateral 
relations.        
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